Version 1: Discounting the Future
- Subject checksum
8e1d5aaf29db2c5927c4633b156c99a37928354332b9261756cb017a1517e9a5- Version checksum
695ce8da32651f4eb467db584c699374263d274b9ff92c7b82e0252ed42bb1f3- Authorship declaration
- unknown; completeness unknown.
- bounty
- Unfunded. The Question Bounties program will attach prizes once it is funded.
- conditions
[ { "collection": "conditions", "id": "short-horizon" }, { "collection": "conditions", "id": "single-lens" } ]- number
- 13
- progress
- A clear map of the positions, what each implies for allocation, and which facts would change the answer.
- statement
- How much should future people count, and how should giving weigh present suffering against risks to the future?
Exact archived Markdown body
Inert source text, including its original formatting. It is not executed as page markup.
## Why it matters If humanity has a long future, vastly more people may live after us than are alive now. How much they count changes nearly every allocation decision. Short funding cycles may leave that choice implicit; see [the Short Horizon hypothesis](/diagnosis/short-horizon/). ## Where to start Philosophers distinguish pure time preference (valuing the future less simply because it is later) from uncertainty about whether help will arrive. Separating the two is the first step. The [Future generations](/tools/values-compass/) framework in the Values Compass is a rough starting point.
Pinned source capture
- src/content/problems/discounting-the-future.md · whole entry
4b9551d130ff277314a85627e8820186ada78cb98f975c5fb6eb47595e91e4e8· 1039 UTF-8 bytes · commit8df2d0ddbc6d91b9841c6bbb94dbde1fc7c00137
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"body": "\n## Why it matters\n\nIf humanity has a long future, vastly more people may live after us than are alive now. How much they count changes nearly every allocation decision. Short funding cycles may leave that choice implicit; see [the Short Horizon hypothesis](/diagnosis/short-horizon/).\n\n## Where to start\n\nPhilosophers distinguish pure time preference (valuing the future less simply because it is later) from uncertainty about whether help will arrive. Separating the two is the first step. The [Future generations](/tools/values-compass/) framework in the Values Compass is a rough starting point.\n",
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"title": "Discounting the Future"
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